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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) is 
transformative as it is committed to 
correcting the injustices of the country’s 
past and to establishing a society based 
on democratic values, social justice and 
human rights.1 The Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution guarantees a variety of 
human rights as one of the mechanisms 
for realising the transformative 
objectives of the Constitution.2 These 
                                                 
1 See the Preamble to the the Constitution.  
2 See, inter alia, Brand D “Introduction to socio-
economic rights in the South African 
Constitution” in Brand D & Heyns C (eds) Socio-
economic rights in South Africa (Pretoria: 
Pretoria University Law Press 2005) at 12-20. 
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guarantees include traditional civil liberties as well as justiciable socio-economic rights. 
The latter seek to secure a basic quality of life for all members of society and afford 
entitlements to the material conditions required for human welfare.3 They include the 
rights of access to housing,4 healthcare services (including reproductive health care), 
sufficient food and water, social security and social assistance,5 further education,6 land 
on an equitable basis,7 and an environment that is not harmful to health and wellbeing.8  
Notably, in Joseph & others v City of Johannesburg & others9 the Constitutional Court 
relied on other constitutional and legislative provisions (the duties of the State) to also 
establish an implicit constitutional right to receive electricity.10 This methodology of the 
judiciary suggests that additional socio-economic rights that are not explicitly 
entrenched in the Constitution may be judicially construed, independent of other 
related more explicit constitutional rights and duties.11  
The Constitution requires that the government adopt reasonable legislation, 
policies and any other measures to realise the rights it grants in the Bill of Rights.12 
Every sphere of government and every organ of State is obliged to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil these rights.13  Still, despite the constitutional commitment to social 
transformation, the explicit constitutional duties of the State and attempts by 
authorities to implement these rights to improve the lives of South Africans, progress is 
slow and millions continue to live under conditions of social hardship.14 This is evident, 
amongst other indicators, from the frequent recurrence of widespread protests over the 
lack or otherwise inadequate provision of social services at the grassroots level,15 with 
millions of South Africans being without access to basic amenities, such as, water, 
electricity and sanitation services. According to various government sources, this 
                                                 
3 See Brand (2005) at 3; Du Plessis A “South Africa’s constitutional environmental right (generously) 
interpreted: What is in it for poverty?” (2011) 27(2) South African Journal on Human Rights 279 at 282. 
4 See s 26 of the Constitution.  
5 See s 27 of the Constitution. 
6 See s 29(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
7 See s 25(5) of the Constitution.  
8 See s 24 of the Constitution. For a discussion of why the constitutional environmental right should be 
considered a socio-economic right, see: Du Plessis (2011) at 279-307; Fuo O “The transformative 
potential of the constitutional environmental right overlooked in Grootboom” 2013 34(1) Obiter 77 at 77-
95. 
9 2010 (3) BCLR 212 (CC) (the Joseph case (2010)).  
10 The Joseph case (2010) paras 34-40. 
11 On the right of access to sanitation, for example, see Nokotyana & others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality & others 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC) at paras 46-49; Fuo O Local government’s role in the pursuit 
of the transformative constitutional mandate of social justice in South Africa (unpublished LLD thesis, 
North-West University 2014) at 130.  
12 See ss 24(b), 25(5), 26(2), 27(2) and 29(b) of the Constitution.  
13 See s 7(2) of the Constitution. 
14 See Government of the Republic of South Africa & others v Grootboom & others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 
(CC) (the Grootboom case (2000)) at paras 1-2; South African Human Rights Commission Report on the 
Right to Access Sufficient Water and Decent Sanitation in South Africa (Johannesburg: South African 
Human Rights Commission 2014). 
15 Alexander P “Rebellion of the poor: South Africa’s service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis” 
(2010) 37(123) Review of African Political Economy 25 at 40. 
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situation is exacerbated by the fact that South Africa remains one of the most unequal 
countries in the world.16  
Some constitutional scholars have partly attributed the slow progress achieved 
in social transformation to the manner in which the Constitutional Court has thus far 
interpreted and enforced constitutional socio-economic rights.17 One of the main 
criticisms relates to the Constitutional Court’s failure to embrace the minimum core 
concept.18 Briefly, the minimum core concept refers to the obligation on States to ensure 
that no significant number of individuals is deprived of the “minimum essential levels” 
of socio-economic rights.19 This obligation thus establishes a minimum core of socio-
economic entitlement on the premise that a basic minimum level of subsistence is 
required for the enjoyment of a dignified human existence.   
In its judgments, the Constitutional Court generally avoids having to elaborate on 
the normative minimum core content of constitutional socio-economic rights by 
immediately turning to an examination of the rights-based obligations imposed on 
government and scrutinising the reasonableness of the government’s measures.20 The 
Constitutional Court has continuously deferred the responsibility of defining the 
content of socio-economic rights to the legislative and executive branches of the 
government on the grounds inter alia of its self-imposed institutional incapacity, the 
need for institutional comity, and reverence for the doctrine of the separation of 
powers.21   
                                                 
16 National Planning Commission (NPC) National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 (Pretoria: NPC 2011) 
at 3; NPC Development Indicators (Pretoria: NPC 2010) at 25; Gelb S “Macroeconomic policy and 
development: From crisis to crisis” in Freund B & Witt H (eds) Development dilemmas in post-apartheid 
South Africa (Scottsville: UKN Press 2010) at 33. 
17 Authoritative sources on this subject cannot be exhausted here. However, see for example: Stewart L 
“Adjudicating socio-economic rights under a transformative constitution” (2010) 28 Penn State 
International Law Review 487 at 492-493; Bilchitz D “Is the Constitutional Court wasting away the rights 
of the poor? Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality: Notes” (2010) 127(4) South African Law 
Journal 591 at 591-605; Davis D “The relationship between courts and the other arms of government in 
promoting and protecting socio-economic rights in South Africa: What about separation of powers?” 
(2012) 15(5) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 1-14; Davis D “Adjudicating the socio-economic 
rights in the South African Constitution: Towards “deference lite”?” (2006) 22 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 301 at 301-327; Brand D “Judicial deference and democracy in socio-economic rights cases 
in South Africa” (2011) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 614 at 614-638; Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: 
Adjudicating under a transformative constitution (Cape Town: Juta 2010) at 131-227; Kapindu R “The 
desperate left in desperation: A court in retreat - Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
revisited” (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 201 at 201-222. 
18 Stewart (2010) at 493; Bilchitz D “Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The minimum core and its 
importance” (2002) 119 South African Law Journal 484 at 484-501; Bilchitz D “Towards a reasonable 
approach to the minimum core: Laying the foundations for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence” 
(2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 1 at 1-26. Generally, the Court has been intensely 
criticised for its refusal to give normative content to constitutional socio-economic rights. See Liebenberg 
(2010) at 131-223; Bilchitz (2002) at 485-501; Stewart (2010) at 492. 
19 See African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) Principles and guidelines on the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(Banjul: ACHPR 2010) at 13.  
20 See Stewart (2010) at 493; Bilchitz (2003) at 1-11. 
21 For a detailed discussion of this topic, see: Brand (2011) at 614-638; Brand D Courts, socio-economic 
rights and transformative politics (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Stellenbosch 2009). 
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In view of the Constitutional Court’s reluctance to embrace, define and develop 
the minimum core content of socio-economic rights and its general deferent attitude 
towards the legislature, this article investigates the possibility that local government 
could afford a minimum core to some socio-economic rights through the exercise of its 
executive and legislative powers. The authors argue that South African municipalities 
are competent to afford a minimum core specifically to the rights of access to water, 
sanitation and electricity. This argument is sustained by a host of legally entrenched 
features of local government, including (a) their relatively autonomous powers and (b) 
the socio-economically related functions and sectors of competence of “developmental 
local government.”22  
The article comprises four main parts. The first part briefly and in general 
situates the notion of the minimum core in the context of international and African 
regional human rights law. The second part reviews how the minimum core has thus far 
been dealt with in South Africa, with specific reference to the approaches adopted in the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. Part three briefly reviews the gist of the 
critique and the viewpoints expressed in the minimum core discourse in South Africa. 
Part four proposes by way of introduction an alternative approach to the adoption and 
actualisation of the minimum core concept by asking to what extent the execution of 
their executive and legislative powers put municipalities in a position to afford a 
minimum core to the rights of access to water, sanitation and electricity.  Part four 
further considers the role of local government against the backdrop of the meaning and 
use of the principle of subsidiarity as implicitly entrenched in the Constitution. 
2 THE MINIMUM CORE OBLIGATION IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
The Constitution obliges courts and any other tribunals or fora that are confronted with 
the interpretation of the Bill of Rights to look to international law for guidance.23 The 
wording of section 39(1) of the Constitution indicates that this injunction is, however, 
not limited to the courts but extends to other deliberative fora (parliament, provincial 
legislatures and municipal councils) and the executive arm of government, with all the 
spheres and branches of the government being jointly responsible for the 
implementation of the Bill of Rights.24 To the extent that the concept of the minimum 
                                                 
22 For details of the notion of “developmental local government” see para 1 of “Section B: Developmental 
Local Government” in the Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development White Paper on 
Local Government (Pretoria: The Department 1998) (the White Paper); Du Plessis A Fulfilment of South 
Africa’s constitutional environmental right in the local government sphere (unpublished LLD thesis, North-
West University 2009) at 461-462; Fuo (2014) at 89-100. 
23 S 39(1) of the Constitution provides: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law”. Own 
emphasis. In the landmark case of S v Makwanyane & another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), the Constitutional 
Court interpreted s 39(1)(b) of the Constitution as requiring courts to use both binding and non-binding 
international law as guiding tools to interpret the Bill of Rights. See paras 35, 37 and 39. 
24 In South Africa, parliament, provincial legislatures and municipalities are deliberative bodies that 
exercise original legislative authority. See Fuo O “Constitutional basis for the enforcement of executive 
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core obligation has become part of international law,25 it may be necessary, where 
appropriate, for the courts as well as the other two branches of government responsible 
for the interpretation and implementation of constitutional socio-economic rights in 
South Africa to consider and implement the “minimum core obligation”.  
The concept of a minimum core for socio-economic rights owes its origin to the 
work of the United Nations (UN) Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights26 
(the Committee on ESCR) as it seeks to establish a minimum legal content for such 
rights that must be realised by State Parties to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966).27 In interpreting the nature of State Parties’ 
minimum core obligations under the ICESCR, the Committee on ESCR explains as 
follows:   
On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, as well as by the body that 
preceded it, over a period of more than a decade of examining State parties’ reports, the 
committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent on every State party. Thus, for 
example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential 
foodstuffs, of essential health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of 
education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant 
were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would 
largely be deprived of its raison d’être. By the same token, it must be noted that any assessment as 
to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource 
constraints applying within the country concerned. Article 2(2) obliges each State party to take the 
necessary steps ‘to the maximum of its available resources’. In order for a State party to be able to 
attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligation to a lack of available resources it 
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in 
an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.28 
                                                                                                                                                        
policies that give effect to socio-economic rights in South Africa” (2013) 16(4) Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 1 at 20-21; s 44(a) read with s 44 of the Constitution; s 43(b) read with s 104 of the 
Constitution; and s 43(c) read with s 156 of the Constitution. In the context of this discussion, this 
suggests that these deliberative bodies should also have regard to international and foreign law when 
they seek to give content to constitutional socio-economic rights. 
25 See Young K “The minimum core of economic and social rights: A concept in search of content” (2008) 
33 Yale Journal of International Law 113 at 120-123; Rosa S & Dutschke M Child rights at the core: A 
commentary on the use of international law in South African court cases on children’s socio-economic rights 
(Cape Town: Children’s Institute of University of Cape Town 2006) at 12-13 and 26-28; Liebenberg 
(2010) at 106-107. 
26 This Committee is the body of 18 independent experts that was established under the UN Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1985/17 of 28 May 1985 to monitor State parties’ implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights “Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (2014) at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRIndex.aspx (accessed 31 March 2014). 
27 Young (2008) at 113; Mbazira C Litigating socio-economic rights in South Africa: A choice between 
corrective and distributive justice (Pretoria: PULP 2009) at 61. South Africa ratified the ICESCR on 16 
January 2015 and it entered into force on 12 April 2015 See: South Africa's Depository Notificaction that 
can be obtained at http://www.seri-sa.org/images/ICESR_CN_23_2015-Eng.pdf (accessed 05 August 
2015). This means that the country is bound by the ICESCR.  
28 Committee on ESCR General Comment No 3: The Nature of State Parties’ Obligations (1990) at para 10. 
Own emphasis. The minimum core obligation is further confirmed in the Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997) at paras 9-10. 
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Over the past decades the Committee on ESCR has further developed the minimum core 
obligation of some socio-economic rights guaranteed in the ICESCR in a number of its 
General Comments.29 It has also firmly established that the minimum core obligation 
translates into a right to basic socio-economic entitlements that can be claimed by 
everyone in desperate need.30  
Closer to home, within the context of the African regional human rights system, 
the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR)31 has embraced the 
notion of the minimum core obligation in its interpretation of State Parties’ obligations 
in terms of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter).32  
According to the ACHPR, State Parties have an obligation at least to ensure the 
satisfaction of the minimum essential levels of each of the socio-economic rights 
guaranteed in the Charter.33  This obligation requires State Parties to ensure that no 
significant number of individuals is deprived of the essential elements of a particular 
socio-economic right.34 According to the ACHPR, the minimum core obligation exists, 
regardless of the availability of resources, and is non-derogable.35 The ACHPR has 
stressed that where a State Party suffers from demonstrable resource constraints it 
remains under the obligation to implement the minimum essential levels of each right 
for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups by prioritising them in all legislative and 
policy interventions.36 Vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in this context are people 
who have faced and/or continue to face significant obstacles to their enjoyment of 
socio-economic amenities.37 The obligation to realise the minimum core content of 
socio-economic rights means that “the state should prioritise the realisation of the 
rights for the poorest and most vulnerable in society” while progressively seeking to 
realise the rights of all.38 The “poorest segment of society” could in this context refer to 
those living in extreme social deprivation. The position taken by the ACHPR appears to 
create an almost absolute right for the poorest people in society to receive minimum 
essential services under the rights provided for in the African Charter.  
                                                 
29 See for example: General Comment No 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (1991) at paras 8-10 and 13; 
General Comment No 12: The Right to Adequate Food (1999) at paras 8, 14 and 17; General Comment No 
14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (2000) at paras 43-44; General Comment No 15: 
The Right to Water (2003) at para 37(a)-(i). 
30 See General Comment 15: The Right to Water (2003) at para 44; Wesson M “Grootboom and beyond: 
Reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court” (2004) 20 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 284 at 298. 
31 The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights was established inter alia to help with the 
interpretation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights ACHPR - adopted in Nairobi, Kenya, 
on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986. 
32 See ACHPR (2010) at 13. The African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted on 
27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986. 
33 ACHPR (2010) at 13.  
34 ACHPR (2010) at 13.  
35 ACHPR (2010) at 13.  
36 ACHPR (2010) at 13. 
37 ACHPR (2010) at 8-9. There is a long list of people classified as disadvantaged and vulnerable. See 
ACHPR (2010) at 8-9. 
38 ACHPR (2010) at 13. 
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From the above it can be discerned that internationally the Committee and the 
ACHPR acknowledge and place a high value on the minimum core obligation of socio-
economic rights on the basis of the understanding that human beings should not have to 
attempt to live without the basic resources needed to maintain their survival.39 
3 THE MINIMUM CORE IN SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The South African discourse on the minimum core traditionally focuses on its potential 
role in the judicial enforcement of constitutional socio-economic rights.40 In other 
words, the discussion turns on why and how the Constitutional Court should define the 
minimum core when assessing compliance with the government’s socio-economic 
rights-based duties.41 As will become evident below, despite the Court’s awareness of 
international jurisprudence and the fact that the text of the Constitution does not rule 
out a minimum core approach,42 the Court has to date refused to define and develop the 
minimum core of constitutional socio-economic rights for a variety of reasons.43 This 
position of the Court is likely to remain unchanged for the time being.44  
This part briefly reviews the existing academic literature and jurisprudence that 
deal with the minimum core in the South African context.  Specific attention is paid to 
four main reasons that have thus far been advanced by the Court for its refusal to define 
and develop the minimum core. In order to be concise, the discussion does not venture 
into the facts of relevant cases or the arguments that were submitted to the Court. It 
focuses primarily on the reasons that have been advanced by the Court for refusing to 
define and develop the minimum core. The literature review is followed by a brief 
critique of the Court’s position.  
3.1 Arguments of the Constitutional Court for abstaining from defining the 
minimum core  
In three socio-economic rights cases before the Constitutional Court,45 it advanced 
“principled, textual, pragmatic and institutional objections” why it was not in a position 
                                                 
39 Mbazira (2009) at 61. 
40 See Bilchitz (2003) at 1-26; Bilchitz (2002) at 484-501. See also Liebenberg (2010) at 146-198. 
41 See Bilchitz (2003) at 1-26; Bilchitz (2002) at 484-501; Mbazira (2009) at 68-72; Liebenberg (2010) at 
163-198.  
42 Davis (2006) at 304; Wesson (2004) at 302. 
43 See the discussion in 3.1 below. 
44 In an almost prophetic tone, Davis, J argues: “A review of the relevant case law reveals that the 
jurisprudence relating to ss 26-28 has run its course. No amount of jurisprudential gnashing of analytical 
teeth or academic concern about the failure to follow comparative or international law will change an 
approach which is reluctant to give clear content to the rights contained in ss 26-28. If the Constitutional 
Court does define these rights with any precision, the burden placed upon the executive by the courts is 
significantly increased. This is precisely what the Court’s approach to these sections is designed to 
prevent”. See Davis (2006) at 304-305. 
45 Grootboom at paras 18-29; Minister of Health & others v Treatment Action Campaign & others (No 2) 
2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (the Treatment Action Campaign case) at paras 26-33; and Mazibuko & others v 
City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (3) BLCR 239 (CC) (the Mazibuko case). Although the applicants in 
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to determine or prescribe the minimum core content of the socio-economic rights 
entrenched in the Constitution.46  These objections are discussed below. 
3.1.1 Lack of access to information 
The Court observed that although the Committee on ESCR has established that the 
socio-economic rights guaranteed in the ICESCR impose a minimum core obligation, its 
General Comment “does not specify precisely what the minimum core is”.47 The Court 
reasoned that the Committee was able to develop the minimum core concept based on 
extensive experience gained from examining reports on State compliance with the 
ICESCR’s obligations over many years.48  The Court stressed that even if it were 
appropriate to have regard to the minimum core obligation to determine the 
reasonableness of the South African government’s measures in relation to applicable 
domestic constitutional rights, this could not be done unless sufficient information were 
available to the Court.49 The Court indicated that in the absence of comparable types of 
information and evidence, it was more difficult to define the minimum core in the 
domestic context.50   
In the Grootboom case (2000) it seems as if the reluctance of the Court to define 
the minimum core was based on the lack of comparable information.51  However, in 
these cases the Court’s implicit acknowledgment of the idea of a minimum core is 
discernible from some of the statements it made. It stated, for example, that “[t]he 
minimum core might not be easy to define, but includes at least the minimum decencies 
of life consistent with human dignity.”52  
3.1.2 Varying local conditions 
The Court expressed the view that it is not possible to determine the minimum 
threshold for the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights because the needs 
and opportunities for the enjoyment of a right may vary according to a wide range of 
factors.53 The needs and opportunities would first have to be determined.54 In the case 
of housing, needs and opportunities are typically dependent on factors, such as, income, 
unemployment, the availability of land, and poverty; differences between urban and 
rural communities; and the economic and social history and specific circumstances of a 
country.55 The Court used this reasoning to underscore the type of complexities that 
must be taken into consideration to be able to delineate the minimum core.56 In the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Mazibuko did not expressly phrase their arguments as involving a minimum core obligation, the Court 
reasoned that the arguments were similar. For details, see Mazibuko at paras 44-61. 
46 See Grootboom at paras 31 and 33; Liebenberg (2010) at 149-151. 
47 See Grootboom at para 30. 
48 See Grootboom at paras 31 and 32. 
49 See Grootboom at para 33. 
50 See Grootboom at paras 31 and 32. 
51 See Grootboom at para 32; Treatment Action Campaign at para 28. 
52 See Treatment Action Campaign at para 28. 
53 See Grootboom at para 32; Mazibuko at para 60. 
54 See Grootboom at para 32. 
55 See Grootboom at para 32. 
56 See Grootboom at para 32. 
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context of the right to housing, the Court noted that while some people might need only 
land to realise their right of access to adequate housing, others might need financial 
assistance or both land and financial assistance.57 In view of this needs-based diversity 
and variability, the Court expressed its doubts as to whether, for example, the minimum 
core obligation should be defined generally or more narrowly with regards to specific 
groups of people.58 The Court reasoned that fixing “a quantified content might, in a rigid 
and counter-productive manner, prevent an analysis of context”, which was at the 
centre of the reasonableness enquiry.59 
3.1.3 Textual formulation of the rights 
The Court reasoned that the textual formulation of the socio-economic rights in sections 
26(1) and 27(1) of the Constitution did not create minimum core entitlements for 
everyone in need.60 The content of the rights created by these provisions could be 
understood only in the context of the obligations imposed on the State by sections 26(2) 
and 27(2) of the Constitution.61 Based on a joint reading of these provisions, the Court 
argued that the Constitution does not oblige the State to provide everyone access to the 
minimum core immediately or on demand.62 All that was possible, and all that could be 
expected of the State, was that it should act reasonably to provide with access to the 
socio-economic rights in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis.63 The Court noted 
that although evidence in a particular case might show that there is a minimum core of a 
particular service that should be taken into account in determining whether or not 
measures adopted by the State are reasonable, the socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution should not be construed as entitling everyone to demand that the 
minimum core of every right be provided to them.64 Based on this construction, the 
Court observed that it would treat the minimum core as possibly being relevant to the 
reasonableness enquiry under sections 26(2) and 27(2), and not as an independent 
rights-based claim conferred on everyone by sections 26(1) and 27(1).65 
3.1.4 Lack of institutional capacity 
The Court also declined to define the minimum core content of socio-economic rights on 
the ground that it lacked the institutional capacity to do so.66 The Court held that the 
judiciary is not institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political 
enquiries necessary for determining what the minimum core of a socio-economic right 
should be.67 This was said to be primarily the responsibility of the executive and 
legislative arms of government, which are best placed to investigate socio-economic 
                                                 
57 See Grootboom at para 33. 
58 See Grootboom at para 33. 
59 See Mazibuko at para 60. 
60 See Treatment Action Campaign at paras 26-29; Mazibuko at paras 48-49 and 57. 
61 See Mazibuko at paras 46-48. 
62 See generally Treatment Action Campaign at paras 28, 35-37; Mazibuko at para 57. 
63 See Treatment Action Campaign at para 35. 
64 See Treatment Action Campaign at para 34.  
65 See Treatment Action Campaign at para 34.  
66 See Treatment Action Campaign at paras 36-39; Grootboom at para 33. 
67 See Treatment Action Campaign at para 37.  
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conditions and to determine what targets are achievable in relation to specific socio-
economic rights.68 In addition, the Court reasoned, as a matter of democratic 
accountability, it was desirable that the executive and the legislature should determine 
the content of socio-economic rights because it was their programmes and promises 
that were subjected to democratic choice.69 The Court expressed the view that its role in 
respect of socio-economic rights was to ensure that the legislative and other measures 
adopted by government were reasonable and that democratic processes of translation 
were protected to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.70 According to 
the Court, where the minimum core of a socio-economic right could in fact be 
determined, this ought to be the responsibility of the legislative and executive arms of 
government.  
From the jurisprudence in the Grootboom, Treatment Action Campaign and 
Mazibuko cases it appears that although the Constitutional Court has to date refused to 
describe to what extent socio-economic rights impose minimum core obligations that 
must be realised immediately by the government, it has not blandly characterised this 
concept of international law as being irrelevant to South Africa. The Court 
acknowledges the existence of the concept and indicates that in some instances it may 
be willing to have regard to it when enforcing socio-economic rights. Still, in the cases to 
date where the minimum core argument was raised, the Constitutional Court took time 
to advance various reasons why it (and other courts) are not suitably positioned to 
determine the minimum core content/obligation of South Africa’s constitutional socio-
economic rights.  
3.2 Critique of the Constitutional Court’s position 
The criticism by scholars and others of the Constitutional Court’s position as explained 
above can be discussed according to the following most prominent points of critique. 
3.2.1 Deferring responsibility for defining the minimum core to other branches of 
government 
The Court’s jurisprudence on the minimum core has been criticised largely on the basis 
of its methodology, which excessively defers the responsibility for defining the 
substantive/core content of socio-economic rights to the executive and legislative 
branches of the government.71 This deference manifests itself in the Court’s application 
of the “reasonableness criteria” to determine if the executive and legislative measures of 
the government that are aimed to effect socio-economic rights pass constitutional 
muster.72 Critics argue that this trend in method is theoretically faulty and that it may 
have undesirable consequences for the realisation of socio-economic rights for those in 
                                                 
68 See Mazibuko at para 61. 
69 See Mazibuko at para 61. 
70 See Treatment Action Campaign at para 36. 
71 See Bilchitz (2002) at 484-501; Mbazira (2009) at 55-57 and 65; Davis (2010) at 95-97; Davis (2006) at 
311-312; Lehmann K “In defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating socio-economic rights and the 
myth of the minimum core” (2006) 22(1) American University International Law Review 163 at 177-178. 
72 The most detailed critique of the Court’s approach to the enforcement of socio-economic rights is 
offered by Brand. See Brand (2009). 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 19 (2015) 
 
Page | 11  
 
desperate need.73 They argue that, in scrutinising the reasonableness of the government 
measures adopted to realise constitutional socio-economic rights, the Court should first 
establish and define a norm or general standard and establish the minimum obligations 
which such a standard imposes on the State.74 The critics argue in this manner on the 
basis that the notion of a minimum core does not refer to the means per se by which a 
socio-economic right must be realised.  Rather, it has to do with the expected norm, i.e. 
the standard of provision (e.g. of water services and housing) necessary to meet 
people’s basic needs.75  Accordingly, it has been maintained, the minimum core 
obligation imposes a higher burden of justification than “reasonableness” in cases of 
non-compliance by the State authorities.76  
3.2.2 The minimum core does not require policy reformulation 
Critics further argue that defining the minimum core does not require that courts 
should rewrite policy or prescribe specific government measures, such as, the passing of 
specific legislation.77 The courts should, however, set an invariable nationally applicable 
“standard” against which the government’s compliance with its socio-economic rights 
obligations can be evaluated.78 The argument is that without such a standard that 
applies for the whole of South Africa, the courts will not be able to establish, in the first 
place whether or not the measures taken by the government may be regarded as 
reasonable.79 A “universal” standard will, however, provide a referent or benchmark 
against which the reasonableness of government measures can be examined and 
evaluated.80 It also creates a means by which to inform the setting of government 
priorities with respect to those in society whose survival is threatened by extreme 
deprivation.81 
3.2.3 Complexities arising from the diversity of needs 
The Court is also criticised for refusing to define the minimum core because of the 
complexities presented by the diversity of needs.82 It has been argued that this is 
irrelevant in the determination of the minimum core, as all people are entitled to the 
same level of provision (in the case of housing).83 The view has been raised that the 
differential needs of people should instead determine the way in which government will 
                                                 
73 For details, see Bilchitz (2002) at 484-500; Bilchitz (2003) at 2. 
74 See Bilchitz (2003) at 5-13; Bilchitz (2002) at 487-488; Stewart (2010) at 494; Steinberg C “Can 
reasonableness protect the poor? A review of South Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence” (2006) 
23 South African Law Journal 264 at 267-268. 
75 Bilchitz (2002) at 488; Mbazira (2009) at 61-62. 
76 Bilchitz (2003) at 17-18; Wesson (2004) at 302. 
77 See Bilchitz (2002) at 492-493; Stewart (2010) at 494; Stewart L “Interpreting and limiting the basic 
socio-economic rights of children in cases where they overlap with the socio-economic rights of others” 
(2008) 24 South African Journal on Human Rights 472 at 482. 
78 See Bilchitz (2002) at 492-493; Stewart (2010) at 494; Stewart (2008) at 482. 
79 Stewart (2010) at 494; Stewart (2008) at 482; Bilchitz (2003) at 1-26. 
80 Stewart (2010) at 494. 
81 Bilchitz (2003) at 15; Mbazira (2009) at 70-72 . 
82 Bilchitz (2002) at 489; Mbazira (2009) at 63-64. 
83 Bilchitz (2002) at 489. 
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have to assist them84 - although individual needs may vary, the general and standard 
obligations imposed on government with regards to people’s socio-economic needs 
should not vary.85 What this argument means in effect is that what really differs (and 
needs to be addressed) in an unequal society is how far off from the minimum core (or 
the “universal” standard) each person lies, and therefore what must be provided by the 
State for each to alleviate his or her needs up to the set minimum level or standard.86 
4 IN NEED OF A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE MINIMUM CORE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
While the criticism regarding the minimum core of socio-economic rights has to date 
mostly been directed at the reasoning and methodology of the judicial arm of 
government, a potential alternative seems to have been downplayed.  The Constitution 
in essence makes it the primary responsibility of the legislature and executive (not the 
judiciary) to give concrete content to the socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights.87 
Furthermore, although the notion of the minimum core obligation features prominently 
in international and African regional human rights jurisprudence, neither the 
Committee on ESCR nor the ACHPR expects to define and develop the minimum core to 
the exclusion of the courts in State Parties. In fact, the jurisprudence on the minimum 
core developed by the Committee on ESCR and the ACHPR guides State Parties in their 
implementation of socio-economic rights with specific reference to measures that 
transcend the function of the courts. In similar vein, Liebenberg argues:  
However, the meeting of minimum core obligations should enjoy prioritised consideration in social 
policy-making and in the judicial enforcement of these rights, due to the urgency of the interests 
they protect. Without the meeting of minimum essential needs which people require to survive, 
the State’s obligation to progressively achieve the full realisation of the rights becomes 
meaningless.88  
It may be discerned from the above that the minimum core obligation should also be 
prioritised in policy making processes (a function of the executive) that seek to give 
effect to socio-economic rights. Steinberg states in this regard that defining the 
minimum content of socio-economic rights should be recognised as a specialised policy 
making exercise that is not (necessarily) well-suited for the process of adjudication.89  
This strongly supports the view that it is the primary responsibility of the executive, and 
by extension also the legislature, to give content (including minimum core content) to 
socio-economic rights.90  
                                                 
84 Bilchitz (2002) at 489. 
85 Bilchitz (2002) at 489. 
86 Bilchitz (2002) at 489. 
87 Courts can also give content to constitutional socio-economic rights through interpretation and have a 
quasi-lawmaking role to translate these rights into enforceable legal claims. See Liebenberg (2010) at 40; 
Pieterse M “Legislative and executive translation of the right to have access to health care services” 
(2010) 14 Law, Democracy and Development 231 at 232; Brand (2005) at 12; Stewart (2010) at 506; Fuo 
“Constitutional basis” (2013) at 14. 
88 Liebenberg (2010) at 164 (own emphasis). 
89 Steinberg (2006) at 268-269. 
90 See Liebenberg (2010) at 40; Pieterse (2010) at 232; Mazibuko at para 67. 
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Although the authors share the view that the minimum core concept should be 
given substance outside of the judicial domain,91 the courts will always be critical in 
testing the content of socio-economic rights (and their translation into law and policy) 
against the principles, values and provisions of the Constitution. It is agreed with 
Liebenberg that the courts, for example, should give effect to government prioritisation 
inherent in the minimum core concept by demanding reasons for any failure on the part 
of the state to fulfil survival related needs as the top priority.92  This suggests that a link 
exists between the minimum core concept and the role and function of the judiciary, the 
legislature and the executive – a link which is usefully and in general illustrated by the 
reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the famous Hartz IV Case 
(2010) (Hartz).93  
The ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Hartz94 illustrates first 
of all how the minimum core concept can be domesticated in a national constitutional 
system. The case involved the Court’s intense scrutiny of the legislature’s calculation of 
welfare benefits, in line with the subsistence minimum needed for the purpose of 
respecting and protecting the inviolable right to human dignity guaranteed by Article 
1(1) of Germany’s Basic Law (the Basic Law). Although requirements for a subsistence 
minimum in German welfare laws was not directly inspired by the minimum core 
obligation as developed by the UN Committee on ESCR,95 the decision points to the fact 
that countries can adopt context specific minimum legal content for welfare rights. In 
Hartz, the Court did not, however, make any reference to international law in deciding 
that the amount of legislated social assistance benefits in question was insufficient to 
meet the minimum subsistence requirements. It relied on Articles 1(1) and 20(1) of the 
Basic Law – respectively, guaranteeing the right to human dignity as an inviolable right, 
and entrenching the social state principle - to construct a constitutional right to 
guarantee, by statute, a subsistence minimum.96 The Court declared certain provisions 
of the existing social welfare legislation to be incompatible with the fundamental right 
                                                 
91 Young (2008) at 125. 
92 Liebenberg (2010) at 164. 
93 See Davis (2012) at 11. The full version of the Hartz IV judgment, written in English, can be accessed at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20100209_1bvl000109en.html (accessed 31 March 2014). See 
also Williams L “The role of courts in the quantitative implementation of social and economic rights: A 
comparative study” (2010) 2 Constitutional Court Review 141; Heinig H “The political and the basic law’s 
sozialstaat principle: Perspectives from constitutional law and theory” (2011) 12(11) German Law 
Journal 1887-1900; Schwebel C “Welfare rights in Canadian and German constitutional law” (2011) 
12(11) German Law Journal 1901; Bittner C “Casenote – Human dignity as a matter of legislative 
consistency in an ideal world: The fundamental right to guarantee a subsistence minimum in the German 
Federal Constitutional Court’s judgment of 9 February 2010” (2011) 12(11) German Law Journal 1941-
1960; Stefanie E “Casenote – The fundamental right to the guarantee of a subsistence minimum in the 
Hartz IV Case of the German Federal Constitutional Court” (2011) 12(11) German Law Journal 1961. On 
how the Constitutional Court could adopt stricter methods of justification, also see Pieterse M “Coming to 
terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 383 at 395-396, and 409-416. 
94 For a detailed background, see Hartz IV Case (2010) at paras 1-106. See also Williams (2010) at 151-
156. 
95 For a discussion on German constitutional developments on this topic, see: Bittner (2011) at 1941-
1944. 
96 See Hartz at paras 132-211; Bittner (2011) at 1941-1942. 
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to a subsistence minimum that was in line with human dignity and the principle of a 
social welfare state.97 However, the Court ordered that the unconstitutional provisions 
stay in force until the legislature had recalibrated and adopted new provisions that 
were constitutionally compliant.98 Notably, the Court refrained from determining 
specific benefit amounts (that is a minimum content) on the basis of its own 
assessments and evaluations on the ground that it was not empowered to do so.99 
A few points of the German Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence must be 
stressed for current purposes. First, although a constitutional right to a subsistence 
minimum was established, the Court indicated that the legislature enjoys a certain 
degree of latitude on a) how the right to that minimum can be given concrete form and 
b) regularly updating the law to ensure that benefits are in line with existing conditions 
of life.100 Hartz suggests that the scope of social benefits and the types of needs of 
people must be informed by society’s views of what is necessary for an existence that is 
in line with human dignity, the concrete circumstances of the person in need of 
assistance, and the economic and technical circumstances.101 The legislature must 
assess all expenditure that is necessary for one’s existence in a way that is logical, 
realistic and transparent, and through expedient proceedings according to actual 
needs.102 To be constitutionally compliant, the calibration of minimum subsistence 
benefits must be based on sound empirical evidence and not random estimates.103 This 
makes it possible for the legislature to take prevailing circumstances into consideration.  
Notably, the Hartz judgment also illustrates that although the general obligation 
(i.e. the standard norm) arising from socio-economic rights (in terms of negative and 
positive duties) does not vary, the minimum substantive content of quantifiable socio-
economic rights may differ from one context to another, amongst age groups and 
geographic regions. In addition, it shows that even where the minimum core obligation 
is expressly grounded in the Basic Law, the executive and legislative branches of 
government have the primary responsibility to calibrate the minimum or standard – 
albeit still in line with the constitutional requirements. 
In view of the German example it is possible to question how, in the three-sphere 
South African government with its executive, legislative and judicial branches, the 
minimum core concept may best be adopted, developed and applied.  Given the 
pervasive trend of deference in the judicial branch of government we propose that an 
increased focus be directed on the role and place of the executive and legislative 
branches of government.  Because of the nature of many of the socio-economic rights in 
the Bill of Rights, we further propose that the role and place of the executive and 
legislative powers in the local government sphere specifically be explored. Several of 
                                                 
97 See Hartz at paras 133-211. 
98 See Hartz at para 212. 
99 See Hartz at para 212. 
100 See Hartz at para 133. 
101 See Hartz at para 138. 
102 See Hartz at paras 139-144 and 162. 
103 See Hartz at paras 138 and 162-198. 
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the constitutional socio-economic rights are directly related to the services to be 
rendered by municipalities in South Africa. 
The focus on municipalities (approximately 270 presently exist in South Africa), 
however, brings into question the “universal” standard element of the minimum core 
referred to earlier. Some writers have argued in this regard that the minimum core 
should be understood as a “relative core minimum”, which would still render it possible 
for a sub-national level standard (a minimum core) to be developed (for example, in 
provinces or federal states) that (a) meets or exceeds any applicable national standards 
and (b) takes into account the prevalent circumstances.104 Young agrees that it is 
possible to develop different standards within countries for different sub-units of 
government, such as, regions, provinces, localities (cities) and authorities in rural 
areas.105 The development of different (tailor-made) minimum standards for different 
sub-units within a State would arguably enable government to address needs diversity 
as it occurs in different parts of the country. Young further submits that there is no 
inherent contradiction where the State adopts different measures in different contexts 
and areas so as to meet more centrally set minimum core requirements.106 This 
suggests that (a) the details of what constitutes the minimum core obligation of 
especially quantitative socio-economic rights (such as water and electricity) may differ 
across a country depending on area-specific conditions in sub-national geographic or 
administrative areas so long as it meets national/centrally set minimum standards,107  
and (b) different measures may be adopted in different sub-national geographic or 
administrative areas to meet national/centrally set minimum standards. Young submits 
that lessons gathered from sub-national levels can be used to inform national minimum 
standards over time. Based on such developments, national government can 
codify/legislate minimum standards for sub-national governments generally.108 
Allowing sub-national units to develop minimum standards within their geographic and 
administrative boundaries provides a valuable opportunity for information gathering 
and learning. This is compatible with the flexibility and tailoring needed for a social 
service provision.109 
The minimum core concept perceived through the lens of local government and 
the executive and legislative branches as opposed to the judicial branch of government 
makes for a particularly democratic approach to the realisation of socio-economic 
rights.  A more diversified approach of this kind is increasingly being favoured by South 
African constitutional law scholars.110  Liebenberg and others hold, for example, that 
democracy and constitutional rights mutually support one another and create the space 
                                                 
104 See Mbazira (2009) at 63-64; Young (2008) at 125. 
105 SeeYoung (2008) at 165-167. 
106 See Young (2008) at 165-167. 
107 See Young (2008) at 167. 
108 See Young (2008) at 167. 
109 See Young (2008) at 167. 
110 See Brand (2011) at 622-625; Liebenberg S “Engaging the paradoxes of the universal and the 
particular in human rights adjudication: The possibilities and pitfalls of meaningful engagement” (2012) 
12 African Human Rights Law Journal 1 at 7-10; Stewart L “The politics of poverty: Do socio-economic 
rights become real only when enforced by courts?” (2011) IV Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo 1510 
at 1515 and 1525-1526. 
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for debate and continuous revision or reformulation of the content of socio-economic 
rights.111 A more democratic approach enables communities to participate in a 
meaningful fashion in the socio-economic related decisions that affect them and the 
larger society of which they are a part.112 Such participation further enables 
government and communities a) to better understand, for example, each other’s needs, 
concerns and limitations as created by resource availability, prioritisation in 
government, work and living environments, and b) to make mutually acceptable trade-
offs113 in defining and developing a minimum content for socio-economic rights. 
However, especially as far as it concerns quantifiable socio-economic interests, the 
application of this alternative and more democratic approach may still depend, as was 
held in Hartz, on area specific empirical data, statistics and other relevant scientifically 
verified information 
5 THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The understanding of the use of the minimum core concept in the legislative and 
executive branches of government remains at most embryonic, and so does the 
preliminary hypothesis that the legislative and executive authority of local government 
position municipalities appropriately to afford a minimum core to some socio-economic 
rights. This premise is sustained, however, by a host of relevant, legally entrenched 
features of local government, including a) municipalities’ relatively autonomous and 
extensive post-1996 legislative and executive authority and b) the substantive areas of 
competence of developmental local government, some of which are at the heart of some 
socio-economic rights.  Our interest in local government vis-à-vis the provincial and 
national legislatures and executives is triggered by three meaningful contextual factors: 
(a) the principle of subsidiarity as applicable in South Africa suggests that a minimum 
core for socio-economic rights may best be established in the local sphere; (b) the fact 
that since 1996 all municipalities in South Africa have a developmental character and 
extended functions that are inextricably linked to the delivery of socio-economic goods, 
such as, water, sanitation and electricity; and (c) the fact that only in the local 
government sphere is provision made for participatory strategic level planning for the 
socio-economic development of local communities. 
5.1 The legislative and executive authority of local government 
Unlike the situation in many other countries, local government in South Africa is 
constitutionally recognised as an autonomous sphere of government with significant 
institutional integrity.114  Municipalities are not creatures of statute and function with 
substantial autonomy and power within a three-sphere co-operative government 
                                                 
111 Liebenberg (2012) at 28; Brand (2009) at 18; Stewart (2011) at 1525-1526. 
112 Brand (2009) at 30; Brand (2011) at 622-625. 
113 Liebenberg (2012) at 9-10 and 25. 
114 De Visser J Developmental local government: A case study of South Africa (Antwerpen: Intersentia 2005) 
at 114. See Christmas A & De Visser J “Bridging the gap between theory and practice: Reviewing the 
functions and powers of local government in South Africa” (2009) 2 Commonwealth Journal of Local 
Governance 107 at 111. 
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system.115 The original legislative and executive powers of local government span a 
range of constitutionally listed areas of competence while municipalities may also be 
assigned additional powers and functions in line with enabling provisions in the 
Constitution.  This means that since 1996 local government has officially been removed 
as a “mere competence or functional area” of another level of government and has 
become a sphere of government in its own right.116 This position has been judicially 
confirmed in a number of cases,117 while the Constitution describes the legislative and 
executive authority of local government in sections 156(1) and (2) as follows: 
(1)A municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has the right to administer (a) 
the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5; and (b) 
any other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation. (2) A municipality may 
make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the matters which it has the 
right to administer. 
The schedules referred to list, for example, the provision of electricity, air quality 
management, municipal health services, the provision of water and sanitation services, 
solid waste management, and the provision of street lighting as areas that fall within the 
legislative and executive authority of local government.   
The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (Systems Act)118 in 
section 11(3) extends the understanding of the constitutionally entrenched authority of 
local government by stating that a municipality executes its legislative and executive 
powers via its Council by means inter alia of developing and adopting policies, plans, 
strategies and programmes, including setting targets for delivery; administering and 
regulating its internal affairs and the local government affairs of the local community; 
implementing applicable national and provincial legislation and its by-laws; providing 
municipal services to the local community, or appointing appropriate service providers; 
preparing, approving and implementing its budgets; monitoring the impact and 
effectiveness of any services, policies, programmes or plans; and establishing and 
implementing performance management systems.  It follows that the execution of local 
government’s legislative and executive powers plays out in various ways and with 
respect to a number of listed, substantive areas of regulation.   
 
                                                 
115 In para 36 of Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council & others 
1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) (the Fedsure Life Assurance case), the Court described the then “new” 
constitutional powers of local government within the context of the Interim Constitution (1993) as 
follows: “The constitutional status of local government is thus materially different to what it was when 
parliament was supreme, when not only the powers but the very existence of local government depended 
entirely on superior legislatures. The institution of elected local government could then have been 
terminated at any time and its functions entrusted to administrators appointed by central or provincial 
governments. That is no longer the position. Local governments have a place in the constitutional order ... 
and are entitled to certain powers, including the power to make by-laws and impose rates.” 
116 De Visser (2005) at 65.  
117 See for example: Fedsure Life Assurance at paras 35-38; City of Cape Town & others v Robertson & others 
2005 (2) SA 323 (CC) at paras 55-60.  
118 S 11(3) of the Systems Act. 
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Regardless of the form it takes, the execution of these powers must consistently 
be informed by the constitutional objectives of local government,119 which include to 
ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; to promote 
social and economic development; to promote a safe and healthy environment; and to 
encourage community involvement. From this it may be discerned that local 
government has the constitutionally entrenched authority to develop, adopt and 
implement various local governance instruments and processes – instruments and 
processes that must be put to use to operationalise its legal duties. This includes, for 
example, the setting of minimum performance targets and priorities to meet the 
municipal duties that arise from socio-economic rights. 
5.2 Institutional subsidiarity and the absorption of socio-economic rights in 
“developmental” local government 
As indicated earlier, the entire government is by virtue of section 7(2) of the 
Constitution responsible for the realisation of the socio-economic rights in the Bill of 
Rights.  It is only in the constitutional “objects” of local government referred to above, 
however, that supplementary mention is made of social and economic development.  
The Constitution further created “developmental local government” through its framing 
of the duties of local government as “developmental” duties.120 These are (a) to 
structure and manage a municipality’s administration, and budgeting and planning 
processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the 
social and economic development of the community and (b) to participate in national 
and provincial development programmes.   
The notion of developmental local government is further unpacked in national 
local government law and policy.  Notably, the White Paper on Local Government of 1998 
(the White Paper) defines developmental local government in an extended definition 
that emphasises “public participation”, “the meeting of basic social, economic and 
material needs”, the “improvement of quality of life”, the “protection of human rights”, 
and the protection of “members and groups within our communities that are most often 
marginalised or excluded, such as women, disabled people and very poor people.”121  
This description of developmental local government is permeated by socio-economic 
rights jargon and suggests a close conceptual link between the goods intended to be 
provided and protected in terms of socio-economic rights and the constitutional 
ambition with, and purpose of, local government.  
                                                 
119 S 152 of the Constitution. 
120 S 153 of the Constitution. 
121 The exact definition is provided in “Characteristics of developmental local government”, “Section B: 
Developmental Local Government” in the White Paper: “Developmental local government is local 
government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable 
ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of their lives…In the 
future, developmental local government must play a central role in representing our communities, 
protecting our human rights and meeting our basic needs. It must focus its efforts and resources on 
improving the quality of life of our communities, especially those members and groups within our 
communities that are most often marginalised or excluded, such as women, disabled people and very 
poor people.” 
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Arguably the most prominent link between developmental local government and 
the realisation of socio-economic rights is to be found in the Systems Act.  The Act 
provides that municipal councils, within their financial and administrative capacity and 
having regard to practical considerations, have the duty to “contribute, together with 
other organs of state, to the progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained 
in sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the Constitution”122 and that “a municipality must in 
the exercise of its executive and legislative authority respect the rights of citizens and 
those of other persons protected by the Bill of Rights.”123   
The principle of subsidiarity offers an additional point of convergence between 
the substantive areas of developmental local government competence and the socio-
economic rights in the Bill of Rights. This principle applies in fields, such as, political 
science, management and government, and is an organising principle of decentralisation 
which states that a societal matter ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest, or least 
centralised authority capable of addressing that matter affectively.124 In governance and 
politics the principle ties in with the institutional design of governments and the notions 
of federalism, pluralism and co-responsibility, as subsidiarity suggests that a central 
authority (eg national government) should have a subsidiarity function vis-à-vis lower 
level authorities, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at 
a more immediate or local level.125  In South Africa the principle of subsidiarity is 
hidden in the phraseology of section 156(4) of the Constitution: 
The national government and provincial governments must assign to a municipality, by 
agreement and subject to any conditions, the administration of a matter listed in Part A of 
Schedule 4 or Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily relates to local government, if - (a) that 
matter would most effectively be administered locally; and (b) the municipality has the capacity 
to administer it.126 
It may be gleaned from this that in principle every socio-economic right matter that 
does not ordinarily fall within the domain of local government127 but which can best be   
“administered” by municipalities must be assigned to local government for it to be 
                                                 
122 S 4(2)(j) of the Systems Act. 
123 S 4(3) of the Systems Act. In line with s 7(2) and the provisions on co-operative government in the 
Constitution, the positive duty to “progressively realise” the socio-economic rights referred to has not, 
however, been framed to exclusively apply to local government. Naturally, the negative duty “to respect” 
is similarly not framed as an exclusive local government duty - the language of the Systems Act is such 
that every municipality is legally compelled to execute its legislative and executive authority as described 
earlier, in a way that will not negate or compromise any socio-economic right. 
124 See Vischer R “Subsidiarity as a principle of governance: Beyond devolution” (2001) 35(1) Indiana 
Law Review 103 at 103-142; Follesdal A “Subsidiarity, democracy, and human rights in the constitutional 
treaty of Europe” (2006) 37(1) Journal of Social Philosophy 61 at 64, for example. 
125 See Vischer (2001) at 103; Follesdal (2006) at 64. 
126 Own emphasis. See also De Visser J “Institutional Subsidiarity in the South African Constitution” 
(2010) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 90. 
127 In other words, all matters that are not listed in relation to local government in Schedules 4B and 5B of 
the Constitution. Such matters, for example, include housing, welfare and education. Various socio-
economic matters are already matters of local government through their original inclusion in Schedules 
4B and 5B. 
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“administered”128 locally and as close to the local community as possible.  However, in 
terms of section 156(4) two pronounced preconditions apply, namely, that 
municipalities must be able to do so “effectively” and that they should have the 
necessary “capacity”.   
Drawing on the general gist of the principle of subsidiarity and against the 
background of the focus of this article, two observations may be made: (a) in theory, 
developmental local government is in a favourable position to determine the minimum 
core of socio-economic rights pertaining to a range of substantive areas within the 
competence of local government; and (b) elected municipal councils bestowed with the 
legislative and executive authority of the municipality ought to be the sub-national 
government structures of choice for the determination of a minimum core for some 
socio-economic rights. However, regardless of the possibility and promise encapsulated 
in (a), we are of the view that too many variables are at play if local government were to 
take on responsibility for sectors that are not listed in the Constitution as an original 
function of local government.  For this reason we argue in favour of the development of 
a minimum core in the local sphere by elected municipal councils, albeit only in relation 
to the socio-economic rights that mirror the original and constitutionally entrenched 
areas of competence of local government - ie the rights of access to sufficient water, 
sanitation and electricity. 
The question remains how the municipal determination of a minimum core 
content for the said socio-economic rights may actually be expected to work. How 
exactly is a minimum core to be developed by municipalities in the face of diversity, 
complexity, and well-known local government problems, such as, a lack of adequate 
human and financial resources, political turmoil, corruption, damning audit reports, and 
severe service delivery deficiencies in many parts of the country?   
5.3 Instrumentation available for the “minimum core” in local government 
By way of introduction we contend that a minimum core developed in the local sphere 
should be developed and engineered by means of the legal instrumentation available in 
local government and ancillary legislation. However, considering the localised diversity 
implied and exemplified by the principle of subsidiarity, it is important to note that it is 
not for any one municipality to read an enforceable minimum core content into any 
socio-economic right per se.  Guided by national and provincial legislation, policy and 
accompanying norms and standards, every municipality must establish a local minimum 
core threshold for the quantity and quality of the basic socio-economic goods and services 
that it is constitutionally (in terms of entrenched rights) obliged to provide, especially to 
people living in poverty.  Where resources allow, the locally set minimum threshold for 
water services, for example, must meet, and where possible exceed, the expectations or 
minimum thresholds set by national or provincial authorities.  It is to be expected that 
all thresholds set in the national, provincial and local spheres should be directed at 
progressive improvement and should oppose any form or degree of regression. As 
                                                 
128 While it is not abundantly clear what “administration” refers to in this context, it may be assumed that 
it refers to the overall governance of a specific matter. 
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submitted in part 4 above, lessons gathered in developing minimum core standards in 
different municipalities across the country could potentially be used to develop and 
codify national minimum core standards. 
We argue that of the municipal governance instrumentation provided in the 
Systems Act and other legislation at least five instruments have significant potential in 
the determination, pursuit, actualisation and monitoring of a local minimum core 
threshold, namely, (a) public participation in local government; (b) municipal 
integrated development planning; (c) municipal budgeting; (d) performance 
management; and (e) municipal by-laws and policies.  
5.3.1 Public participation in local government 
One of the constitutional and statutory objectives of local government in South Africa is 
to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local government.129 This objective is complemented by Chapter 10 of the 
Constitution, which determines that the South African public administration system 
must respond to the needs of people, while the public must be encouraged to participate 
in law- and policy-making processes as well as the planning functions of government.  
These provisions complement the call for a more democratic approach to the realisation 
of socio-economic rights referred to earlier - municipalities will have to engage with 
communities in order to arrive at the basic (minimum) quality and quantity of social 
goods and services to be provided for.  Municipal councils must, for example, consult the 
local community about the level, quality, range and impact of municipal services and 
related options for service delivery.130  
A municipality must also allow for and enable public or community 
participation131 through a) its political structures (such as the municipal council), b) its 
municipal committees (to which the general public has access), c) the structures and 
processes of the municipal administration mandated to receive petitions and 
complaints, and d) forums for community participation in respect of public inputs into 
and review of the municipality’s integrated development plan (IDP), performance 
management system (PMS), budget, and the development of its by-laws.  The Municipal 
Planning and Performance Management Regulations132 provide for the establishment of 
an IDP forum where no other municipality-wide structures for community participation 
exist. The purpose of such an IDP forum is to facilitate the legally required community 
participation in the IDP process.  Municipal committees, in general (including the 
council’s portfolio committees) and ward committees, in particular, are additional 
structural instruments to ensure that participatory local government is established and 
sustained.133 Municipalities may, for example, establish advisory committees to support 
                                                 
129 S 152(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
130 S 4(2)(e) of the Systems Act. 
131 See ss 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Systems Act; Fuo (2014) at 229-245. 
132 Regulation 15 of the Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management 
Regulations (2001) GN R796 in GG 22605 of 24 August 2001. 
133 Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) Ward Committee Resource Book 
(Pretoria: IDASA 2005) at 10. 
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the effective and efficient performance of any municipal functions or powers (for 
example, water and sanitation related functions and powers). Such committees may 
consist of members of council and advisory members who are not members of council, 
such as locally based experts in law, science or development studies.134 Ward 
committees must enhance participatory democracy in local government,135 while they 
are also responsible for making recommendations on any matter (including socio-
economic rights matters or concerns) affecting a ward. Recommendations can also be 
made to the ward councillor or through the said councillor to the municipal council.136 
Provision is made in several environmental, water and other sector laws for additional 
participative structures. However, not all of these structures are required by legislation 
that has an exclusive local government application.  
5.3.2 Provision for socio-economic needs in integrated development planning 
Every municipality in South Africa is legally obliged to do operational and development 
oriented planning.137 Integrated development planning is required: (a) to achieve local 
government objectives; (b) to give effect to the developmental duties of municipalities; 
and (c) for municipalities to contribute, in association with other organs of State, to the 
progressive realisation of constitutional rights.138 The output of integrated development 
planning is an IDP.139 Nothing may be more important for a local minimum core for 
some socio-economic rights than periodical strategic planning in local government, 
which directs the internal governance of municipalities, as every municipality must 
“conduct its affairs in a manner that is consistent with its integrated development 
plan.”140 The appeal of integrated development planning as an instrument for the 
actualisation of a minimum core for some socio-economic rights is further found in the 
fact that it is subject to provincial monitoring and support, and that the plan must be 
annually reviewed.141   
However, the Systems Act is largely silent about the socio-economic rights 
interface of IDPs. The linkage between integrated development planning and socio-
economic development is subtly made in terms of a range of national sector laws. Some 
environmental sector laws require that municipalities must, in addition to the sector 
plans mentioned in the Systems Act, generate specific sector management plans as 
supplementary parts of their IDPs.142 Examples are integrated spatial development 
                                                 
134 See s 79 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (Structures Act). 
135 S 72 of the Structures Act. 
136 S 74 of the Structures Act. See also IDASA (2005); South African Local Government Association 
(SALGA) “Code of Conduct for Ward Committee Members” (date unknown) at 
http://www.salga.org,za/pages/knowledge--hub/Guidelines-for-municipalities (accessed 05 August 
2014). 
137 Fuo (2014) at 343-386. 
138 S 23(1) of the Systems Act. 
139 The Systems Act provides in detail for the process, drafting, content, review and status of IDPs.  
140 S 36 of the Systems Act. 
141 See ss 31 and 34 of the Systems Act. 
142 Fuo (2014) at 355-357 outlines the legally prescribed sector plans provided for in legislation other 
than the Systems Act. 
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plans, energy plans,143 and water services development plans.144  The legal framework 
for integrated development planning is further enabling insofar as only the minimum 
requirements in terms of substance and the IDP process are specified. It follows that 
nothing prevents any municipality from innovatively using its IDP (including its sector 
plans) in combination with other local government instruments (such as its PMS, 
indigent policies and budget) to leverage resources to set, and work towards, specific 
and agreed minimum targets for the provision of basic social goods in the jurisdiction of 
the municipality – access to which is protected in the Bill of Rights.  
Considering that the generation of, adherence to and reporting of the 
performance of IDPs are mandatory, they are powerful instruments to drive and direct 
municipalities in the areas of water services, sanitation and electricity.145 However, for 
any IDP to optimally fulfil its potential function as an instrument for the actualisation of 
a minimum core it must: (a) identify and focus on and prioritise community needs; (b) 
plan for and define realistic objectives and targets to discharge the duties specified by 
municipal and other law as well as the rights in the Bill of Rights; and (c) realistically 
inform the municipal PMS, the audit committee, budgeting and financing processes as 
well as any other internal governance control processes. The effectiveness of integrated 
development planning in relation to the fulfilment of socio-economic rights further 
depends on the design, content and implementation of the municipal development 
priorities and strategies in their order of priority; the operational strategies of the 
council, the performance indicators and targets defined in terms of the IDP, and the 
nature and extent of oversight functions afforded by the municipal PMS.146  
However, it is important to note that despite provision in local government law 
and policy, some municipalities often underutilise their powers in developing context 
specific basic minimum standards in relation to water, electricity and sanitation, for 
example.147 As a result, some municipalities have adopted mutatis mutandis national 
minimum standards in relation to water, electricity and sanitation, prescribed by the 
National Indigent Policy (2006) without much regard to local conditions.148 
5.3.3 Rights based duties embodied in performance management 
The legally required municipal PMS149 complements the IDP, planning and 
implementation as well as budgeting processes by reporting performance against the 
municipality’s socio-economic rights related priorities, strategies, targets and key 
performance indicators150 committed to in a municipality’s IDP.151 
                                                 
143 S 8.1 of the Department of Minerals and Energy White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of 
South Africa (Pretoria: The Department 1998). 
144 S 3.3 of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997.  
145 Ss 25 and 36 of the Systems Act.  
146 These priorities, strategies, indicators and targets form part of the legally prescribed content of every 
municipality’s IDP. See s 26 of the Systems Act. 
147 See Fuo O “Local government indigent policies in the pursuit of social justice in South Africa through 
the lenses of Fraser” (2014) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 187 at 207. 
148 See Fuo “Local government indigent policies” (2014) at 207. 
149 See the detailed provisions in chap 6 of the Systems Act. 
150 S 41(1)(c) of the Systems Act. 
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The actualisation of a locally set minimum core arguably demands checks on 
delivery and accountability as (a) the entire government remains responsible for the 
realisation of socio-economic rights and (b) measures must be in place to check for 
“progressive” development. An important internal assurance function can be served by 
PMSs as they enable the municipality’s audit committee and others charged with 
overseeing municipal performance to verify the municipality’s performance and assure 
adherence to internal controls.  As part of its performance management the 
municipality should also take steps to improve performance with regard to those 
development priorities and objectives where performance targets are not met, and 
should establish a process of regular reporting on performance levels to the council, to 
the community, and to other organs of State.152   The performance of an IDP is reported 
to overseeing agents in the national and provincial spheres of government. In terms of 
the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (MFMA), a 
municipality must annually submit an IDP performance report, together with its 
financial report, to the MEC for local government. The provincial legislatures should 
then report municipal performance to the Minister.153 The Minister submits an overall 
and consolidated municipal performance report to Parliament and to the MECs for Local 
Government.  
5.3.4 Municipal budgeting and financing for socio-economic needs 
In addition to local strategic planning and performance management there are two 
enabling processes to ensure effective local government which may be prerequisites for 
the actualisation of a minimum core set for socio-economic rights locally, namely, (a) 
the municipal budget process, and (b) the accessing of funding to execute IDP 
commitments.  The total structuring, management and control of accessing, using and 
reporting on municipal financial resources constitute the financial management system 
of a municipality.154 Sourcing funding as a key element of the financial management 
system is critical for most municipalities as they are dependent on provincial and 
national authorities and other sources for some of the financial resources155 required to 
enable them to implement their IDP commitments. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in any detail the financial 
management system, or even the budgeting process and the related fiscal functions and 
                                                                                                                                                        
151 The executive committee or executive mayor is responsible: to generate the municipality’s PMS; to 
assign responsibilities in this regard to the municipal manager; and to see to the adoption of the PMS by 
council. See s 39 of the Systems Act. 
152 S 41(1)(d) of the Systems Act. The procedural requirements include that an IDP must be generated in a 
participative and inclusive way and that it must be publicly available. Municipal performance in terms of 
the IDP must also be publicly reported and verified by the Auditor-General. 
153 Ss 47 and 48 of the Systems Act. 
154 Financial management systems in local government may be said to have four prominent purposes: 
safeguarding income assets and capital; monitoring performance; accountability through auditing etc; 
and budgeting.  
155 An extensive legal and policy framework regulates municipal finance management in South Africa. 
This framework includes, for example, the MFMA, the Annual Division of Revenue Acts, the Provincial 
Division of Revenue Acts, the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, and the Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Relations Act 97 of 1997.  
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duties of municipalities. It is sufficient to indicate that detailed provision is made in 
legislation to regulate matters, such as, the requisite structures required to manage the 
financial processes, and the responsibilities of office bearers who are responsible for 
specific tasks such as revenue management, budgeting, general financial management, 
and financial auditing etc. Accessing funding instruments and unlocking funds to finance 
IDP related projects are key elements of local governance. The South African legal 
dispensation156 for funding local government has been significantly transformed in 
recent years, providing for a decentralised financial management system157 and the 
increased financial autonomy of municipalities.  Local government typically has access 
to five sources of funds: revenue from its own sources e.g. municipal property rates and 
service fees, (b) direct transfers158 from other spheres of government, (c) public and 
other grants available on demand, (d) collaborative agreements, such as, public/private 
partnerships, and e) loans and bonds.   Thus, apart from the direct transfer of funds 
from other spheres of government, local funding sources range from (a) municipal rates 
and taxes, to (b) other service fees, (c) income sources such as sales of electricity and 
water, (d) development levies or charges, and (e) the sale of assets.  However, these 
funding sources are generally insufficient to fund the maintenance of infrastructure, the 
eradication of service delivery backlogs and the provision of basic services on a 
sustainable basis.  
Since the quantum of available financial resources would determine the ability of 
a municipality to actualise any locally set minimum core, it is important to note that a 
number of alternative capital sources may be available to those municipalities which 
have the foresight, suitable capacity and skills to unlock and leverage capital. Examples 
include government grants and grants from other private funders,159 public-private 
partnerships, and loans and bonds. 
 
 
                                                 
156 The legal framework consists of the Constitution, the Division of Revenue Act 6 of 2011 (DORA), the 
MFMA and the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004, among others. 
157 Girishankar N, DeGroot D & Pillay TV “Measuring intergovernmental fiscal performance in South 
Africa: Issues in municipal grant monitoring” (2006). Available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp98.pdf (accessed 17 February 2015). 
158 Allocations from national to local government are provided for in terms of s 6(3) of the DORA. National 
and provincial departments can also transfer some of their own resources to authorities in other spheres 
in the form of grants. Grants may be conditional, unconditional or needs-based. Approximately 22 line-
function departments may be directly or indirectly involved. The DORA provides different types of grants 
and grant categories including, for example, the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG), the Neighbourhood 
Development Partnership Grant (NDPG), the Urban Settlements Development Grant, the Land Care 
Programme Grant: Poverty and Infrastructure Development; and the Human Settlements Development 
Grant. See further the Schedules to the DORA. 
159 Municipalities have access to a several funds administered by a number of funding agencies. The 
challenge for most municipalities is to identify potential funds and then to apply for and responsibly use 
such funds. The Department of Water Affairs, for example, published a Guideline Document in 2008 listing 
funding agencies ranging from government and other public sector funds to international funders and 
private funding agencies that may consider funding water-related infrastructure projects. See Department 
of Water Affairs and Department for International Development Funding Agency Booklet (Pretoria: 
Department of Water Affairs 2008) at 6-41. 
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5.3.5 Municipal by-laws and policies 
A municipality’s by-laws are binding local laws – local legislation that binds both the 
municipality and the local community.  By-laws may be critical for regulating 
community behaviour in a way that makes it possible for a municipality to sustainably 
deliver the minimum of basic social goods and services it has committed to in its IDP, 
budget and other plans.  Municipalities derive their legislative power to draft and issue 
by-laws from the Constitution and legislation.160 They may develop, adopt, implement 
and enforce by-laws in all of the areas listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution 
as well as in additional areas that may be provided for in national legislation. All by-
laws161 must conform to the by-law making process specified in the Systems Act and 
they must be published for public comment before their adoption.162 By-laws may also 
not be in conflict with national or provincial laws.163  A municipal by-law may be 
enforced only after it has been published in the relevant provincial Official Gazette.164   
Other than these formalistic requirements, municipalities may creatively devise 
their legislative power to set minimum local standards for the provision of access to 
water, sanitation and electricity, for example.  A municipality has wide-ranging powers 
to “do anything else within its legislative and executive competence” to give effect to its 
mandate.165 A by-law may therefore create wide-ranging powers, such as, (a) to grant 
municipal officials a right to conduct inspections and audits, b) to gain access to 
property, data and information, c) to conduct validations after an occurrence and do 
periodic external reviews of the performance of regulated entities, such as, external 
service providers, and d) to monitor certain activities166 against drinking water and 
sewer effluent water quality etc.167  It is recommended that the framing of by-laws be 
preceded and informed by consideration of the municipality’s policies, strategies, 
programmes and plans, such as, IDPs and policies for the indigent.168 A municipality 
must compile and maintain hard and electronic copies of its collection of by-laws.169 
In addition to using by-laws, municipalities may typically also use local policies 
to allocate resources, regulate people’s behaviour, promote public participation, 
communicate their understanding of the problems confronting communities, and 
express their vision for the future.170 Municipalities may adopt and implement policies 
                                                 
160 See chap 7 of the Constitution and chap 3 of the Systems Act. 
161 S 11(3)(m) of the Systems Act. 
162 S 12 of the Systems Act. 
163 S 156 of the Constitution. 
164 S 162 of the Constitution. 
165 S 11(3)(n) of the Systems Act. 
166 Breton A & Salmon P “Compliance in decentralized environmental governance” in Breton A, Brosio G, 
Dalmazzone S & Garrone G (eds) Governing the environment: Salient institutional issues (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar 2009) at 176. 
167 Breton & Salmon (2009) at 177. 
168 S 11(3)(a) of the Systems Act. Municipalities may monitor the impact and effectiveness of any of its 
services, policies, programmes and plans. See s11(3)(j). 
169 The files must be regularly updated and annotated and they must be kept at the municipal head office 
as the municipal official record of all applicable bylaws. See s 15 of the Systems Act. 
170 See Fuo (2014) at 380; Fuo “Local government indigent policies” (2014) at 188. 
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in all of the areas where they have original powers and functions. The power of 
municipalities to develop, adopt and implement policies is most clearly articulated in 
section 11(3) of the Systems Act. Municipalities may be innovative in designing and 
implementing local policies, especially because the Systems Act does not prescribe the 
process that should be followed or the scope of the content of municipal policies. 
Local government policies for the indigent constitute a specific type of policy that 
could productively be put to use by municipalities towards the realisation of some 
constitutional socio-economic rights.171 Through its indigent policy a municipality might 
for example define the minimum quality and quantity of social goods (such as water and 
electricity) that it seeks to provide to households living in poverty within its 
jurisdiction. As suggested earlier, municipalities that possess the necessary means are 
at liberty to go beyond the levels and range of free basic services guaranteed at the 
national level.172 However, no municipality is permitted to go below the minimum 
thresholds set at the national level. 
6 CONCLUSION 
As part of the pursuit of the constitutional transformative objectives of the Constitution, 
this article advances an alternative perspective on the inception of the concept of a 
minimum core content for constitutional socio-economic rights in the South African 
context.  Despite our recognition of the prevalence of judicial resistance to adopting, 
developing and using the idea of a minimum core content in the courts’ evaluation of 
State measures to realise the socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights, we argue that 
such core content could be determined and realised through the exercise of the 
legislative and executive authority of municipalities, and that a selection of the 
accompanying municipal instruments might be put to valuable use.  On the basis of the 
fact that developmental local government and the suite of socio-economic rights were 
designed to ensure the protection of a basic quality of life for all members of South 
African society and the provision of entitlements to the material conditions required for 
human welfare, we conclude with the following main observations. 
First, municipalities should accept the trend of judicial deference regarding the 
minimum core meaning of relevant socio-economic rights as affording them an 
opportunity to cater for basic local needs according to their local capacity and in their 
local context. Furthermore, the local government system of integrated development 
planning, performance management and budgeting enables municipalities to overcome 
the challenges faced by the judiciary in terms of determining the minimum core. The 
judiciary bemoans its lack of access to sufficient information on basic human and 
welfare needs, varying local conditions, and its apparent lack of institutional capacity to 
make factual and political enquiries. Municipalities, on the other hand, have such 
information immediately available, and are empowered by the Constitution and local 
                                                 
171 See Fuo (2014) at 380-391; Fuo “Local government indigent policies” (2014) at 194-199. 
172 Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) (now Department of Co-operative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs) (CoGTA) National Framework for Municipal Indigent Policies 
(Pretoria: DPLG 2006) at 23.  
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government law to address local needs in certain respects. Thus, they are able to decide 
on the means and the standard of provision to meet people’s basic needs with respect 
inter alia to water, sanitation and electricity. In addition, needs diversity for the 
purposes of establishing a minimum core for some socio-economic rights poses less of a 
challenge for a local authority than for a provincial or State organ, as it would develop 
such standards for a smaller and more homogenous local community. Furthermore, 
municipalities may successfully put to use their by-law and policy making authority to 
calibrate local standards with newly published provincial or national standards, while 
they are able to regularly update by-laws and policies dealing with the ever-changing 
basic needs of the members of the local community. 
This alternative approach to the inception of the minimum core does not 
undermine the role of courts in the enforcement of constitutional socio-economic rights. 
As we have argued, rather than dictating the minimum core of a socio-economic right, 
courts should adopt a stringent approach to justification akin to that of the Federal 
German Constitutional Court in Hartz. Courts should ensure that adopted minimum 
standards are informed by sound empirical evidence, for example. Therefore, litigation 
remains a potent instrument for ensuring that local authorities and government, in 
general, remain accountable to communities on the measures put in place to give effect 
to socio-economic rights. 
 
 
